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A "MERE EXPECTANCY?" WHAT RIGHTS DO
BENEFICIARIES OF A REVOCABLE TRUST HAVE PRIOR TO
THE DEATH OF THE SETTLOR?
RICHARD C. AUSNESS
I. Introduction.
Revocable trusts became a popular form of a will substitute in the 1960s
and remain so to this day. If the trust is funded, the settlor typically retains the
right to receive income from the trust, the right to invade the trust principal, and
the right to modify the terms of the trust. In addition, the settlor may serve as
trustee or may appoint a third-party trustee. At the settlor's death, the trust assets,
which may also include property transferred to the trust from the settlor's
probate estate by means of a pour-over provision in the will, will be distributed
to the trust's remainder beneficiaries' in accordance with the terms of the trust.
Because the settlor usually retains an absolute right to revoke or modify
the terms of a revocable trust at any time, courts generally refuse to afford
remainder beneficiaries any rights in the trust while the settlor is alive. Instead,
courts have ruled that remainder beneficiaries have no standing to seek
information about the trust or challenge the trustee's actions, regardless of
whether the trustee is the settlor or a third-party. However, the situation becomes
somewhat murky once the settlor dies and the interests of remainder
beneficiaries are no longer "mere expectancies."
Part II briefly examines the nature and origin of the revocable trust. Part
University Research Professor and Stites & Harbison Professor of Law, University of Kentucky; B.A.,
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In less enlightened times, holders of vested and contingent remainders were often known as
"remaindermen," regardless of whether they were male or female. This somewhat inaccurate and sexist
term has since fallen from favor and been replaced in more progressive circles by the less offensive
designation "remainder beneficiary."
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III considers how courts treat objections by remainder beneficiaries to actions
taken by the settlor while serving as trustee. Part IV surveys attempts by
remainder beneficiaries to question whether the settlor lacks sufficient mental
capacity to revoke or modify the trust or whether such actions are the product of
undue influence. Part V concerns the ability of remainder beneficiaries to contest
the actions of a third-party trustee while the settlor is alive.
Part VI deals with the problem of whether remainder beneficiaries
should have the power after the settlor's death to challenge actions taken by the
settlor while alive on the theory that the settlor was mentally incompetent or was
subject to undue influence. Part VII looks at requests for information or an
accounting from a third-party trustee made after the settlor's death. Part VIII
focuses on the controversial and perplexing issue of whether a remainder
beneficiary should be allowed to sue the third-party trustee of a revocable trust
after the settlor's death for wrongdoing allegedly committed during the settlor's
lifetime. Part IX evaluates both doctrinal and normative perspectives on the
question of remainder beneficiary rights after the death of the testator. Finally,
Part X offers a solution to the conflict of authority on this issue.
II. The Origins and Functions of Revocable Trusts.
An inter vivos trust may be either revocable or irrevocable. Ordinarily, a
revocable trust may be amended, modified, or revoked by the settlor while he is
alive without the consent of the trustee or anyone else.2 However, the settlor may
limit this power by requiring that it be exercised with the consent of another, or
he may provide that the exercise of this power will not take effect until some
period of time has passed. On the other hand, when a trust is irrevocable, it can
only be amended, modified, or revoked with the consent of the settlor and any
others who have a beneficial interest in the trust. Finally, a revocable trust may
be fully funded, or it may be funded at the settlor's death by a pour-over
provision in the settlor's will.5
Although legal title to property is transferred by the settlor to the trustee,
it is still considered to be the settlor's property during his lifetime.6 Thus, the
settlor of a revocable trust typically retains the right to income from the trust and
2 See Estate of Giraldin, 290 P.3d 199, 201 (Cal. 2012); Tseng v. Tseng, 352 P.3d 74, 75-76 (Or. Ct. App.
2015).
See Alan Newman, Revocable Trusts and the Law of Wills: An Imperfect Fit, 43 REAL PROP. TR. & EST.
L.J. 523, 553 (2008).
4 See, e.g., Peck v. Peck, 133 So. 3d 587, 588-89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Preston v. City Nat'l Bank,
294 So. 2d 11, 14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Mahan v. Mahan, 577 A.2d 70, 72 (Md. 1990); Hein v. Hein,
543 N.W.2d 19, 20 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995); In re Zinke's Trust, 83 N.Y.S.2d 813, 814 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1948).
See David Horton, Tomorrow's Inheritance: The Frontiers ofEstate Planning Formalism, 58 B.C. L.
REv. 539, 588 (2017).
6 See Estate of Giraldin, 290 P.3d at 203.
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controls the disposition of the trust corpus at death.7 The settlor may elect to
serve as trustee, either alone or with a co-trustee, or he may provide for the
appointment of a third-party trustee. The settlor may also create a joint trust with
a spouse or another person.
Revocable trusts first achieved popularity as a response to the public's
dissatisfaction with the probate process, which was regarded as "slow,
unnecessary, and expensive."9 One of the earliest advocates of revocable trusts
as an alternative to probate was Norman Dacey, whose book, How to Avoid
Probate!, was published in 1965 and quickly became a "runaway best seller."o
Some fifty years later, revocable trusts are now "the most commonly used trusts
in the United States."'
Revocable trusts are widely perceived to be will substitutes, and settlors
often use a revocable trust instead of a will in order to avoid probate.12 However,
a revocable trust, unlike a will, provides a great deal of flexibility because it can
be modified without complying with the formalities of executing a new will or
codicil.'3 The power to amend, which includes the power to revoke,1
4 also
enables the settlor to respond to changing circumstances by changing or adding
beneficiaries or modifying the dispositive provisions of the trust in other ways.
Another desirable characteristic of a revocable trust is privacy.
Although a few states require revocable trusts to be recorded or registered,
particularly if the trust assets include real property,16 in most cases, the contents
of a revocable trust will not be disclosed to the general public even after the
settlor dies.17 If the settlor so desires, information about the trust, or even its very
existence, may be withheld from remainder beneficiaries while the settlor is
alive.18 An additional degree of privacy can be preserved if the settlor's will
contains a pour-over provision that devises probate property to an existing
revocable trust.19 In most states, the only persons who will receive information
See Fla. Nat'l Bank of Palm Beach Cty. v. Genova, 460 So. 2d 895, 897 (Fla. 1984).
8 See John H. Martin, The Joint Trust: Estate Planning in a New Environment, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. &
TR. J. 275, 277 (2004).
9 Horton, supra note 5, at 557 (citation omitted).
'o David J. Feder & Robert H. Sitkoff, Revocable Trusts and Incapacity Planning: More than Just a Will
Substitute, 24 ELDER L.J. 1, 13 (2016).
' Newman, supra note 3, at 524.
12 See Horton, supra note 5, at 546.
13 See Newman, supra note 3, at 526.
14 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 63 cmt. g (2003).
15 See In the Matter ofTrust No. T-1 ofMary Faye Trimble, 826 N.W.2d 474,486 (Iowa 2013).
16 See Ralph M. Engel, The Pros and Cons of Living Trusts as Compared to Wills, 29 EST. PLAN. 155,
163-64 (2002).
17 See Frances H. Foster, Privacy and the Elusive Quest for Uniformity in the Law of Trusts, 38 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 713, 716 (2006).
18 See Erik R. Beauchamp, It's My Money 'Til 1Die: When Trustees Must Notify Heirs and Beneficiaries
Concerning a Trust That Has Become Irrevocable, 32 McGEORGE L. REV 670, 672 (2001).
'9 See Frances H. Foster, Trust Privacy, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 555, 564-66 (2008).
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about a revocable trust at the settlor's death will be the beneficiaries, and even
they may not be fully informed about the trust's assets and liabilities.20 in
contrast, wills must be probated, and once this occurs, they will become public
records.21
Settlors can also use revocable trusts as a planning mechanism for
22incapacity. A properly drafted revocable trust can provide for the management
of the settlor's property without having to appoint a guardian if the settlor
becomes incapacitated.23 Another advantage of revocable trusts is that they
usually are not subject to court supervision after the settlor's death.24
III. Challenges by Beneficiaries to Actions by the Settlor while
He is Still Alive.
In general, while the settlor is alive, the beneficiaries of a revocable trust
do not have a sufficient interest in the trust to sue the trustee for breach of
fiduciary duty or failure to provide information about the trust, regardless of
whether the settlor is the trustee or whether a third-party trustee had been
25appointed. The modem tendency is to characterize the beneficiary's interest in
such cases as a "mere expectancy."26 This is similar to the status of the
beneficiary under a will prior to the death of the testator.27
Fulp v. Gilliland illustrates that the beneficiary of a revocable trust is
unlikely to prevail against a competent settlor who is acting as the trustee or co-
trustee of the trust.28 In that case, Ruth Fulp placed her family farm in a
29revocable trust and named herself as trustee. Under the terms of the trust, Ruth
retained the right to use the farm and any other trust assets; after her death, the
remaining trust assets, including the farm, would be distributed to her three
children.30 As Ruth got older, she decided to sell the farm to pay for expenses of
living in an upscale retirement home. 3 ' At the same time, she wished to keep the
farm in the family, so she agreed to sell it to her son, Harold Jr., for less than its
20 Newman, supra note 3, at 555.
21 Foster, supra note 17 (declaring that a will, once admitted to probate, becomes "available to
beneficiaries, heirs, thieves, reporters, and the 'just plain curious' alike ....
22 Feder & Sitkoff, supra note 10, at 3.
23 See Dennis M. Patrick, Living Trusts: Snake Oil or Better Than Sliced Bread?, 27 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1083, 1087-88 (2000).
24 Id. at 1096.
25 Furthermore, creditors of a remainder beneficiary of a revocable trust cannot reach the beneficiary's
"interest" in the trust while the settlor is alive. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 56 cmt. b (2003).
26 See Lauren Ashley Gribble, Justice before Generosity: Creditors' Claim to Assets of a Revocable Trust
after the Death of the Settlor, 48 AKRON L. REV. 383, 386, 398 (2015).
27 See Newman, supra note 3, at 531-32.
28 See generally Fulp v. Gilliland, 998 N.E.2d 204, 209-10 (Ind. 2013).
29 Id. at 205.
30 Id. at 206.
' Id. at 205.
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market value.32 However, Ruth resigned as trustee before the sale was
completed, and the successor trustee, Ruth's daughter, Nancy, refused to go
through with the sale, whereupon Harold Jr. sued for specific performance.
33
The trial court found that Ruth was competent and that Harold Jr. had
not exerted undue influence.34 Nevertheless, the trial court denied Harold Jr.'s
request for specific performance because it concluded that Ruth breached her
fiduciary duty as trustee to her children by selling the farm for less than its fair
market value.35 The appeals court ruled that Ruth sold the farm as settlor not as
trustee, and that the sale constituted a de facto amendment of the trust.36 Upon
further appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court held that Ruth owed her children no
fiduciary duties, whether acting as trustee or as settlor, and was free to sell the
farm at less than fair market value.37
Examining the provisions of the Uniform Trust Code, as well as cases
from other states, the court found that as long as a trust was revocable, the
38
trustee only owed fiduciary duties to the settlor. Examining the rights of Ruth
and her children, it was apparent from the trust instrument that Ruth reserved the
right to "control the farm and treat it as own her property."
39 This interpretation
was reinforced by another provision in the trust that declared it was established
solely for Ruth's "use and benefit," which included the right to use all of the
trust's assets.40 In contrast, the court found that the children's interest in the trust
was "purely secondary and arises only if Ruth chooses not to divest them and if
she chooses not to use all of the assets."1 Therefore, the court concluded that
Ruth's fiduciary duty as trustee was to herself as settlor and primary
42beneficiary.
The court also rejected Nancy's claim that Ruth was subject to a conflict
of interest as trustee because it would bring Ruth's rights and duties into
conflict.43 Namely, the argument was that if Ruth owed a duty to both herself
and the holders of the remainder interest, she, as trustee, would be unable to
comply with her wish, as settlor, to sell the trust property to Harold Jr. if it would
conflict with the desire of her other children to sell the property to the highest
32 Id. at 206.





38 Fulp, 998 N.E.2d at 206.




43 Fulp, 998 N.E.2d at 209.
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bidder.44 However, imposing such a duty on Ruth would effectively make the
trust irrevocable, contrary to her desire to amend or revoke it.45 Accordingly, the
court ordered Nancy to convey the farm to Harold.46
Iowa's Court of Appeals reached a similar result in Hoelscher v.
Sandage.7 In that case, the settlor, Thelma Warman, transferred her 400-acre
farm to her four children in 1950, reserving a life estate for herself.48 In 1983,
Thelma apparently placed her interest in the farm in a revocable trust.49 Thelma
and one of her long-time friends were named as co-trustees.5 0 Three of Thelma's
children later deeded their remainder interest in the farm to her in return for an
eleven percent fee interest, leaving Thelma with a sixty-seven percent fee
51interest in the farm. In 1984, Thelma and her children took out a mortgage on
the farm, and in 1986, the bank brought a foreclosure action against them.52
Later that year, Thelma voluntarily revoked the trust.53 Shortly thereafter, two of
the children brought suit against the co-trustees, claiming that they fraudulently
induced them to agree to mortgage their interests in the farm.54
Affirming the trial court's decision in favor of the trustees, the appellate
court concluded that there was no evidence of fraud on the part of the trustees.5
It also held that the children had no interest in the trust property as long as
Thelma was alive.5 6 According to the court, "Thelma retained discretion, under
the terms of the Thelma Trust, as a co-trustee and settlor of the Thelma Trust to
use her sixty-seven percent of the home farm as she pleased regardless of its
inclusion in the Thelma Trust."57 Therefore, the court held that the children
lacked standing to sue the trustees in connection with mortgaging the trust
property.5 8
Both Fulp and Hoelscher make it clear that remainder beneficiaries will
not be able to challenge the actions of a competent settlor-trustee. However, the
rights of the remainder beneficiaries are less clear when the settlor-trustee is
mentally incapacitated or subject to undue influence.5 9 Arguably, if the
4 Id
45 Id. at 210.
4 Id. at211.
47 See generally Hoelscher v. Sandage, 462 N.W.2d 289 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990).
4 Id. at 290.
49 Id. at 291.
50 Id
51 Id.
52 Hoelscher, 462 N.W.2d at 291.
53 id.
$4 Id.
s Id. at 293.
56 Id. at 294.
57 Hoelscher, 462 N.W.2d. at 294.
58 Id.
5 See Newman, supra note 3, at 534.
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incapacity is permanent in nature, for all practical purposes, the trust would no
longer be revocable, and the rights of the remainder beneficiaries would then be
vested.60 Likewise, if a purported revocation was the product of undue influence,
it should be treated as ineffective so that the original remainder beneficiaries
would still have an interest in the trust. However appealing this argument may
be, it has not found much favor with the courts.61
For example, in Linthicum v. Rudi, Clare Linthicum-Cobb executed a
will and a revocable inter vivos trust in 2002.62 Clare named herself as trustee
and reserved the right to amend or revoke the trust without having to notify any
of the other beneficiaries.63 After Clare's death, the trust principal was to be
transferred to her brother and sister-in-law, Ernette and Myrna Linthicum, who
were also named as successor trustees at Clare's death.
In 2004, Clare amended the trust to replace Ernette and Myma with
Arnold Rudi, her deceased husband's nephew, as the successor trustee.6
5 The
trust provided that Arnold would act as successor trustee at Clare's death.
66
A guardian was later appointed for Clare because of concerns about her mental
condition.67 Subsequently, Ernette and Myrna brought suit seeking a cancellation
of the trust amendment, alleging that it was the product of mental incapacity and
undue influence.68 However, the district court ruled that Ernette and Myrna
lacked standing to challenge the amendment because the settlor was still alive
and dismissed the suit.69
On appeal, Ernette and Myrna maintained that several state statutes
allowed them to challenge Clare's actions while she was alive.70 One statute
permitted any "'interested person' to petition the court for proceedings
'concerning the internal affairs of a non-testamentary trust' and to obtain 'any
appropriate relief provided with respect to a testamentary trust . . . while
another statute allowed a trustee or beneficiary of a trust to petition the court to
determine the existence of the trust and the validity of a particular trust
provision.72 However, the Nevada Supreme Court held that Ernette and Myrna
were not entitled to relief under these statutes because their interests were subject
6 See id. at 536 (citations omitted).
6 See id. at 532.





67 Linthicum, 148 P.3d at 747.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 748.
7o Id.
71 Id. (citing NEv. REv. STAT. § 164.015(1) (2006)).
72 Linthicum, 148 P.3d at 748; see also NEV. REV. STAT. § 153.031(1) (a), (d) (2006).
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to complete divestment while the settlor was alive.73
These cases suggest that courts will not allow remainder beneficiaries to
challenge decisions of the settlor while the settlor is alive. This is consistent with
the view that the assets of a trust belong solely to the settlor as long as the settlor
retains the power to revoke the trust.
IV. Claims of Lack of Mental Incapacity or Undue Influence.
Courts have seldom allowed remainder beneficiaries to challenge a
settlor's actions by claiming that the settlor was mentally incapacitated or subject
to undue influence. For example, in Florida National Bank v. Genova, the
Florida Supreme Court held that a co-trustee did not have standing to challenge a
revocation by the settlor on grounds of undue influence.74 In Genova, Ann
Genova established a revocable trust in 1979, naming herself and the Florida
National Bank as co-trustees.75 Ann reserved an income interest in the trust and
76provided for gifts to numerous beneficiaries at her death. Ann married Mark
Genova in 1978 and divorced him the following year.77 At the time of their first
marriage, Ann was seventy-six years old and Mark was thirty-two years old.78
Ann and Mark remarried in 1980, and shortly thereafter Ann sent a letter to the
Bank requesting that her trust be revoked. She signed a power of attorney
directing the co-trustee to transfer the trust assets to her account at another
bank.80 However, the co-trustee refused to honor the request because it believed
the request was the result of undue influence exercised by her husband Mark.
The trial court ruled that the revocation was invalid on grounds of undue
influence.82 However, the appellate court reversed, concluding that Ann could
not be deprived of her right to revoke the trust in the absence of a judicial
determination or medical certification that she was physically or mentally
incapacitated.83 This decision was affirmed by the Florida Supreme Court, which
declared that inter vivos transfers that transferred full title to another could be
invalidated on grounds of undue influence or incapacity, but revocations could
not because no transfer occurred when the trust was created.84 Since Ann's
action clearly manifested an intent to revoke the trust, the court refused to permit
n Linthicum, 148 P.3d at 748-49.
74 Genova, 460 So. 2d at 896.









m Genova, 460 So. 2d at 897.
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the co-trustee to collaterally attack her decision.
The Third District Court of Appeal of Florida relied on Genova in the
case of Ullman v. Garcia to conclude that the guardian of an incapacitated settlor
could not challenge the validity of her revocation of several Totten Trusts on
grounds of undue influence.86 In 1984, the settlor, Irene Oldensmith, then
seventy-five years old, executed a will leaving her residuary estate to David
Garcia. She also named him as the beneficiary of various Totten Trusts. 8 In
1986, a court declared Irene to be incompetent and appointed Howard Ullman as
her guardian.89 Howard then petitioned to the court to invalidate the will and the
amendments to the Totten Trusts, alleging that David exerted undue influence
upon Irene.90 However, the trial court dismissed the action to invalidate the
amendments to the Totten Trusts, relying on a statute that provided "[a]n action
to contest the validity of all or part of a trust may not be commenced until the
trust becomes irrevocable."9 1
On appeal, the court cited the holding in Genova and declared:
Undue influence is not an available remedy because of the
unique nature of a revocable trust in that it reserves to the
settlor the power to end the trust at any time, and postpones the
devisee's enjoyment of the trust until the settlor's death. This
retention of control distinguishes a revocable trust from the
other types of conveyances to which the principle of undue
influence is applied, such as gifts, deeds, wills, and contracts.92
Consequently, the appellate court held that Irene's guardian could not contest the
validity of her actions with respect to the Totten Trusts on the basis of undue
influence on the part of David Garcia.
93
On the other hand, at least one court has allowed a beneficiary to contest
a ruling on a settlor's purported revocation of a trust on the basis that the settlor
lacked sufficient mental capacity to make an effective revocation.
94 In
Conservatorship of the Estate of Irvine, the settlor, Alberta Irvine, executed a
will in which she bequeathed property to several charities and relatives,
" Id. at 898.





" Ullman, 645 So. 2d at 169 (citing FLA. STAT. § 737.206 (1992) (repealed 2007)).
92 Id. at 169-70 (citing Genova, 460 So. 2d at 897).
9 Id. at 170.




including her sister, Claire Fletcher.95 Shortly thereafter, in 1986, Alberta
executed a codicil, prepared by Robert Stefan, which effectively left her entire
estate to Claire.96 In 1990, Alberta executed a new will leaving tangible personal
property to Claire, the residue of her estate in trust for Claire's maintenance, and
a gift to Claire's issue and various charities, including the Children's Hospital
Medical Center Foundation ("Children's Hospital").97 Finally, in 1991, Alberta
executed a new will and a revocable trust, naming Claire as executor and
trustee.98 The dispositive provisions were roughly similar to those of the 1990
will. 99
After discussions with Alberta, Thomas Mitchell, Alberta's attorney,
prepared a new revocable trust and will, which provided for distributions after
Alberta's death to various charities, including Children's Hospital; the balance of
the estate was to be held in trust during Claire's life, with income paid from the
trust to Claire and her four sons.100 After Claire's death, the trust corpus would
be distributed among Claire's sons.01 The trust instrument provided that Alberta
could amend it by a written document delivered to the trustee.102
Alberta's health began to deteriorate in 1992, and she apparently fell
increasingly under the control of her housekeeper, Sylvia Villamil.103 In August
1992, Alberta executed an instrument, prepared by William Peddar, removing
Claire as trustee.104 A separate document, which Claire did not receive, named
Robert and the Mechanics Bank of Richmond as successor trustees.105 Upon
receiving this notice of removal, Claire petitioned the court to appoint her as
conservator of Alberta's person and estate.'06 In October 1992, Alberta amended
the trust ("Amendment No. 3") and expressly disinherited Claire and her
children, leaving the balance of the trust assets to four charities, including
Children's Hospital.107 In May 1994, Claire, in a separate action, petitioned the
court for instructions regarding Amendment No. 3 and sought to invalidate it.'0 8
Claire contended that she never received a copy of Amendment No. 3 as required




98 Id. at 588-89.
99 Irvine, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 588-89.




'04 Irvine, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 589.
0 Id. at 590.
10 Id.
07 Id. at 591.
in Id.
'0' Irvine, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 590.
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In December 1993, the probate court ruled that the removal notice was
invalid because Alberta lacked sufficient mental capacity to remove the
trustee.110 In September 1994, the probate court also determined that
Amendment No. 3 was invalid because Claire, as trustee, was not properly
notified."' Children's Hospital appealed, arguing that the court did not have the
authority to consider these issues as long as the settlor was alive.112 The appellate
court, relying on the Restatement of Trusts, declared that a settlor could limit the
power to revoke by specifying a particular manner of revocation." Sidestepping
the question of whether Alberta was sufficiently competent to validly revoke the
trust, the court concluded that the purported revocation was invalid because it
did not comply with the revocation procedure specified in the trust instrument.114
Courts are understandably reluctant to allow remainder beneficiaries, or
anyone for that matter, to challenge a settlor's actions with a claim of mental
incompetence or undue influence while the settlor is alive in the absence of a
formal finding of incompetence. This appears to be consistent with the way wills
are treated."'5 In either case, allowing such challenges while the settlor or testator
is still living might lead to Premature-and possibly embarrassing-exposure of
the instrument's contents.
V. Actions against a Third-Party Trustee while the Settlor is
Alive.
It appears that remainder beneficiaries are no better off when a
revocable trust is administered by a third-party trustee than when the settlor acts
as the trustee. The rationale behind this approach is that the beneficiaries have no
standing to sue the trustee for breach of fiduciary duty because the trustee owes a
fiduciary duty solely to the settlor while the settlor is alive and not to the other
beneficiaries of the trust.'17 Presumably, the settlor can monitor the trustee's
performance and take appropriate action if the trustee violates a fiduciary duty.
This principle is illustrated in Ex Parte Synovus Trust Co." Robert and
Helen Raines, along with their three children, brought suit against Synovus Trust
Corporation and its agents for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of
contract.19 In 2000, Robert and Helen each established revocable trusts and
110 d.
"' Id. at 591.
"12 Id.
"3 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 331 cmt. d (1959)).
"4 Irvine, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 594-95.
115 See Foster, supra note 17, at 721.
116 Id. (citation omitted).
117 Newman, supra note 3, at 532-34 (citation omitted).
"8 See generally Ex Parte Synovus Tr. Co., N.A., 41 So. 3d 70 (Ala. 2009).
"9 Id. at 71, 73.
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funded them with approximately one million dollars apiece.120 Robert and Helen
each served as co-trustees of their respective trusts along with Synovus.121
Robert, Helen, and their children were named as beneficiaries of each of these
trusts.122 Both settlors signed investment agreements with Synovus, which gave
it the "sole discretion to manage, invest, and have custody of the property in the
trusts" in order to maximize the growth of the trust assets.123 When Synovus
resigned as co-trustee in 2005, the trust beneficiaries claimed to have discovered
that the company had not managed the trusts as promised.124
After Robert, Helen, and their children sued Synovus and their agents,
the defendants sought to dismiss the children's breach of fiduciary duty claims
for lack of standing.125 When the trial court refused to grant the defendants'
motion, they sought a writ of mandamus from the Alabama Supreme Court.126
Ruling for the defendants, the court cited a provision of the recently adopted
Uniform Trust Code, which declared that the duties of the trustee of a revocable
trust were owed exclusively to the settlor.127 Therefore, the court reasoned,
regardless of whether the children suffered any injury to their rights as trust
beneficiaries as the result of the defendants' conduct, those rights were subject to
the control of Robert and Helen as long as the trusts were revocable.128
Accordingly, the court held that the "children's causes of action for breach of
fiduciary duty did not seek redress for legally protected rights," and therefore,
they had no standing to pursue those claims.129
Will a different rule apply if the settlor is alive, but incapacitated? When
section 603 of the Uniform Trust Code ("UTC") was first promulgated, it
provided that the trustee's duties were owed exclusively to the settlor only while
the settlor had legal capacity.130 However, a number of states refused to accept
this language when they adopted the UTC,131 causing the drafters to amend that
section by placing brackets around the language that made the exclusive duty
rule applicable to settlors who had the capacity to revoke the trust.132 As it now
stands, states are free to omit the bracketed language when they adopt the
120 Id. at 72.
121 id.
122 id.
123 Synovus, 41 So. 3d at 72.
124 Id. at 73.
125 id.
126 id.
127 Id. at 74 (citing ALA. CODE § 19-3B-603(a) (2007)).
128 Synovus, 41 So. 3d at 74.
129 id.
130 See Newman, supra note 3, at 534; see also UNIF. TRUST CODE § 603(a) (2000).
131 These states were Alabama, Florida, Kansas, Maine, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Virginia. Newman, supra note 3, at 534 n. 49.
132 id.
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UTC.1 33 In addition, settlors can provide that a revocable trust will become
irrevocable if they are incapacitated.134 Nevertheless, it is likely that the
prevailing default rule remains that the trustee of a revocable trust owes a duty to
the incapacitated settlor or the settlor's guardian, conservator, or agent under a
durable power of attorney, and not to the remainder beneficiaries.1 35
Furthermore, the holding in Johnson v. Kotyck suggests that remainder
beneficiaries are not entitled to receive an accounting while the settlor of a
revocable trust is still alive, even if the settlor is incapacitated.136 In Johnson,
Elisabeth Frudenfeld created a revocable trust in 1987 and named herself as
trustee.137 In 1996, a court found that Elisabeth was unable to care for herself and
appointed a professional conservator to manage her affairs; Elisabeth's daughter
Karla Kotyck was appointed as successor trustee.138 Laurie Johnson, another
daughter, subsequently petitioned the probate court to order an accounting by the
trustee.139 The court, however, sustained Karla's demurrer and dismissed the
complaint. 140
On appeal, Laurie contended that the remainder beneficiaries were
entitled to an accounting because their rights as beneficiaries vested once the
settlor's power to revoke terminated. 14 However, the appellate court disagreed
with this analysis, pointing out that the conservator had the power to petition the
probate court for an order authorizing the revocation of a revocable trust.'42
Therefore, the trust was still revocable and Laurie's rights were not yet vested.143
Furthermore, the court observed that the conservator was legally obligated to
render periodic accountings that could be viewed and challenged by the
remainder beneficiaries.'44 Consequently, the court concluded that Laurie should
utilize this process rather than demanding an accounting from the trustee.145 For
these reasons, the appellate court affirmed the probate court's dismissal of
Laurie's petition.146
The rule that insulates third-party trustees against lawsuits by remainder
beneficiaries seems to rest on the notion that the remainder beneficiaries have no
1' UNIF. TRUST CODE § 603 cmt. (as amended 2004).
134 See Newman, supra note 3, at 534.
'" Id. at 536.





141 Johnson, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 102.
142 id.
143 Id. at 103.
' Id. at 103-04.
145 Id. at 104.
146 Johnson, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 105.
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beneficial interest in the trust so long as it remains revocable. Furthermore, if the
settlor is unable to protect himself against wrongdoing by third persons, the
better solution is to petition a court to appoint a guardian or conservator to do
this for him.
VI. Challenges Based on Settlor's Lack of Mental Capacity or
Undue Influence.
Courts have occasionally allowed remainder beneficiaries to raise
questions about a settlor's mental capacity once he is dead. For example, in
Paananen v. Kruse, Erma Carson executed a will and revocable trust in 1987.147
The trust agreement provided that the trust assets would be used for Enna's
benefit during her lifetime, then for the benefit of her husband Harry for his life,
and then for Karl Amschler, Harry's nephew, for the duration of his life.1 48
Afterwards, the residue of the trust was to go to Muriel Paanenen, a minister's
widow who volunteered at the retirement center where Erma lived.149
The 1987 will and trust were substantially different from an earlier will
and testament hat Erma executed in 1985, which left her entire estate to Karl or
his wife, and then to her great nieces, Marcia Kruse and Mary Johnson.50 Both
Harry and Karl were extremely ill when these documents were signed, and they
both died a short time thereafter, leaving Muriel as the sole beneficiary.'5 ' After
Erma died in November 1988, Marcia and Mary sought to have the 1987 will
and trust invalidated on the grounds of undue influence.152 At the ensuing trial,
Erma's psychiatrist testified that she suffered from Alzheimer's disease and was
particularly susceptible to undue influence.'5 3 However, on appeal, Muriel
argued that undue influence was not available as a remedy to revoke a revocable
trust once the settlor had died and the trust had ripened into a testamentary
disposition. 154 Distinguishing the Genova case, the court held that once a gift is
completed by death and the grantor's capacity is established, the only way for
the decedent's estate to regain control of the property is to allege undue
influence.5 5 Finding that there was ample evidence that Muriel exercised undue
influence over Erma, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court
* 156in favor of Marcia and Mary.
In Cloud v. U.S. Nat'1 Bank, the Oregon Supreme Court allowed





152 Paananen, 581 So. 2d at 187.
1 Id
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remainder beneficiaries, after the settlor's death, to question a trustee's
disbursements made to third parties while the settlor was allegedly
incompetent.157 The settlor, Martha Sconawah, an elderly Yakima Indian,
executed a revocable trust in 1959, naming the defendant Bank as her trustee.
Per the terms of the trust, Martha reserved the right to withdraw any or all of the
trust corpus at any time.159 After Martha's death, Mary Cloud was to receive the
income from the trust, and upon her death, the trust assets were to be divided
among Mary's children.160 Martha was fluent in several Indian dialects but could
not read, write, or speak English and, therefore, customarily "signed" documents
with her thumbprint.161 Martha died in 1971 from a heart attack due to advanced
-162
arteriosclerosis.
The controversy involved two withdrawals from the trust to Martha's
granddaughter, Esther, made shortly before Martha's death.163 In each case,
Esther had written a letter of withdrawal and obtained Martha's thumbprint
signature as an authorization.1 64 The first withdrawal was for $5,000 and the
second, made the day before Martha's death, was for $23,000.165 After the
settlor's death, some of the remainder beneficiaries brought suit against the
Bank, claiming that it breached its fiduciary duty to them by making invalid
disbursements to Esther because the settlor was either incompetent or subject to
undue influence.166 The plaintiffs sought an accounting, reimbursement for
invalidly disbursed funds, and removal of the trustee.'67 The trial court dismissed
the plaintiffs' suit and they appealed.168 On appeal, the Oregon Supreme Court
rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the trustee was strictly liable for making
improper disbursements from the trust when the settlor was incompetent or
subject to undue influence.169
Instead, the court observed that the Restatement of Trusts provided a
safe harbor for trustees who made disbursements under a trust that was
subsequently determined to be invalid.170 According to the Restatement, the
trustee would be liable only if he either knew at the time "that the trust was
' Cloud v. U.S. Nat'1 Bank of Or., 570 P.2d 350, 352-53 (Or. 1977).




162 Cloud, 570 P.2d at 353.
113 Id. at 353-54.
6 Id. at 353.
6 Id. at 353-54.
66 Id. at 352-53.
167 Cloud, 570 P.2d at 352.
'6' Id. at 353.
169 Id. at 355.
70 Id. at 354 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 226A (1959)).
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invalid[,] or had or should have had reasonable doubt as to its validity."l71 Thus,
the Restatement adopted a negligence standard, rather than a strict liability
standard, in such cases. Relying on the Restatement's reasoning, the court
concluded that the trustee could rely on the presumption that the settlor's request
for a disbursement from the trust was valid until he had reason to believe
otherwise.172
Applying this standard, the court determined that the trustee was not
liable for the first disbursement o Esther because it had no reason to believe that
Martha was either incompetent or subject to undue influence.173 On the other
hand, the court concluded that the circumstances surrounding the second
withdrawal were sufficient to put the Bank on notice that Martha might be
incompetent.174 Therefore, the court ordered the Bank to reimburse the trust for
the disbursements made to Esther the day before Martha's death.175
The mental competence of the settlor was also involved in Brundage v.
Bank of America.176 In 1992, Dorothy Gutsgell executed a revocable trust
agreement naming herself as lifetime beneficiary and trustee.177 The trust
provided that the residue of the trust would go to her husband if she predeceased
him, but if she survived him, the residue would go to her niece, Lucy
Brundage.178 In addition, at Dorothy's death, 6,000 shares of American Home
Products ("AHP") stock would be distributed to four of her other nieces and
nephews ("Brundages") and an additional 3,000 shares of AHP stock would be
distributed to a godson.17 9 The AHP stock split in 1995 and 1998 while Dorothy
was alive.'s0
Dorothy amended the trust after the first stock split to reflect the
increased number of shares that the trust now held, but she failed to do so after
the second split in 1998.'si After her husband's death in 2001, Dorothy, with the
help of her attorney, created a number of partnerships, to whom she transferred
some of the AHP stock; she retained 54,000 shares in the trust to be distributed
to her nieces, nephews, and godson upon her death.182 Around this time, Dorothy
"' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 226A.
112 Cloud, 570 P.2d at 355.
173 Id. The court observed that on the day of the second disbursement, Martha was lying on her back in the
car when she executed the withdrawal document. Id. In addition, it declared that "her advanced age, her
general physical deterioration, and their inability to communicate with her" should have raised concerns
about Martha's competence in the minds of the Bank's officers. Id. at 356.
174 Id.
"7 Cloud, 570 P.2d at 356-57.
176 See Brundage v. Bank ofAm., 996 So. 2d 877, 880 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).




"' Brundage, 996 So. 2d at 879.
182 id.
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resigned as trustee, and Lucy and Bank of America took over as co-trustees.
183
When Dorothy died in 2003, the trustees distributed the remaining 54,000 shares
of stock to the designated beneficiaries in accordance with the terms of the
trust.184
Shortly thereafter, the Brundages brought suit against Lucy and the
Bank, claiming that as a result of the 1998 split, they were entitled to double the
number of shares of stock that they had actually received.185 They also alleged
that the co-trustees breached their fiduciary duty in connection with their
approval of the stock transfers to the partnerships.186 During discovery, evidence
was uncovered that indicated that at the time that the transfers were made,
Dorothy might not have been sufficiently competent to manage her financial
affairs.'87 However, the trial court refused to allow this evidence in because the
plaintiffs had not raised the issue of Dorothy's mental condition in their original
pleadings.'88 The trial court ruled in favor of the co-trustees, concluding that they
did not owe a fiduciary duty to the Brundages while Dorothy was alive.
On appeal, the court agreed that while the co-trustees did not owe a
fiduciary duty to the remainder beneficiaries during Dorothy's lifetime, they did
owe such a duty to Dorothy, and that duty could be enforced against them by the
beneficiaries after Dorothy's death if the breach of duty affected their interests as
well.190 According to the court, Dorothy's consent to the transfers of stock,
which would have constituted a partial revocation of the trust, would have been
invalid if she was no longer competent to give her consent at that time.191
Therefore, the Brundages should have been permitted to raise the issue of
Dorothy's competence at trial and the lower court's refusal to allow them to do
so amounted to an abuse of discretion.192 Consequently, the court reversed the
trial court's ruling and remanded the case back for a new trial.
193
VII. Requests for Information or an Accounting.
Another issue is whether remainder beneficiaries can, after the settlor's
death, demand information or an accounting from third-party trustees with
respect to transactions or activities that occurred prior to the settlor's death.
183 Id.
"4 Id. at 880.
185 Id.
186 Brundage, 996 So. 2d at 880.
187 Id.
1ss Id.
`9 Id. at 880-81.
'9 Id. at 882.
11 Brundage, 996 So. 2d at 883.
192 id.
19 Id. at 884.
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A. Requests for Information of Trust Terms.
As a general rule, trustees are not required to provide information about
the trust to the remainder beneficiaries of a revocable trust while the settlor is
still alive.' 94 On the other hand, a duty to provide information will arise once the
settlor dies and the trust becomes irrevocable.195 However, it is less certain
whether a court will order a trustee to provide information after the settlor's
death about transactions or activities that took place while the settlor was alive.
The Court of Appeals of Oregon determined in Tseng v. Tseng that a state statute
required the trustee of a revocable trust to provide the trust beneficiaries with
information about the administration of the trust prior to the settlor's death.196
In that case, a revocable trust was created by Patrick Tseng, who
immigrated to the United States from China in 1954. 197 While in China, Patrick
was married and had five children: Michael, Richard, Dejin, Deya, and Depi.'
Believing that his wife, Sunyun, and children were dead, Patrick married Stella
after he arrived in America, and the couple had two children, Paul and Peter.99
In 1979, Patrick discovered that his family members in China were still alive and
subsequently established a revocable trust naming Stella and his surviving
children as remainder beneficiaries.200 Paul and Peter were named as co-
trustees.201 After Patrick died in 2009, Michael, Richard, and Dejin learned that
Paul and Peter had transferred $1.8 million out of the trust between March 2008
and Patrick's death, leaving only a small balance in the trust.202
Paul and Peter refused to explain why the money was withdrawn from
the trust or what happened to it, despite repeated requests for information from
Michael, Richard, and Dejin.203 When their petition was dismissed by the
probate court, the plaintiffs appealed.204 The appellate court reasoned that the
statutory provision, which relieved the trustee of a revocable trust of the duty to
provide information to remainder beneficiaries, no longer applied once the
205settlor died and the trust became irrevocable. Instead, the trustee would now
be required to provide qualified beneficiaries with whatever information was
194 See T.P. Gallanis, The Trustee's Duty to Inform, 85 N.C. L. REv. 1595, 1602-03 (2007); see also UNIF.
TRUST CODE § 603(a).
'9 See Taylor v. Nationsbank Corp., 481 S.E.2d 358, 362 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997); Fletcher v. Fletcher, 480
S.E.2d 488, 491 (Va. 1997).
'6 Tseng, 352 P.3d at 75.
197 Id. at 76.
198 Id. at 76-77.
'9 Id. at 77.
200 id




205 Id. at 78-79.
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206 t
required to be disclosed when a trust was irrevocable. In particular, the statute
provided that beneficiaries were entitled to be "reasonably informed about the
administration of the trust and of the material facts necessary for those
beneficiaries to protect their interests."207 Therefore, the appellate court
remanded the case back to the probate court to determine whether the trust
instrument authorized the co-trustees to remove $1.8 million from the trust and,
208
if not, whether Patrick directed, consented to, or ratified this transfer of funds.
It is hard to determine what the rule is with respect to a trustee's
obligation to provide information about a revocable trust after the settlor's death.
Obviously, the trustee would be required to inform beneficiaries of the existence
of the trust and the nature of their interest in it, unless the terms of the trust
restricted the disclosure of certain information. However, the Tseng case
suggests that courts may be more willing to require the disclosure of information
about transactions that took place during the settlor's lifetime if it suspects the
trustee was guilty of misconduct during that period.209
B. Requests for or Objections to an Accounting.
A formal accounting involves much more effort on the part of the
trustee than merely providing general information about the trust. Furthermore, a
demand for an accounting by a beneficiary is often a prelude to a lawsuit against
the trustee for breach of fiduciary duty. Consequently, it is not surprising that
most courts have been reluctant to order an accounting for the period when the
settlor was alive. For example, the Iowa Supreme Court followed this majority
210
approach in the Trimble case. Mary Trimble created a revocable trust in
1999.211 During her lifetime, she was the sole income beneficiary of the trust and
acted as trustee until shortly before her death when she appointed Judith
212 213
Cunningham as her successor trustee.212 Mary died in 2009 at the age of 104.
At that time, there were eighteen beneficiaries, including Judith Cunningham and
Marylynn Miller.2 14 The trust instrument did not require the trustee to report or
215
account to these beneficiaries while Mary was alive.
After Mary died, Marylynn requested Judith to provide her with "annual
accounts of the trust property, liabilities, receipts, and disbursements from its
206 Tseng, 352 P.3d at 78-79.
207 Id. at 79 (quoting OR. REv. STAT. § 130.710(1) (2015)).
208 Id. at 83.
209 See id.
210 Trimble, 826 N.W.2d at 478.
211 id.
212 Id. at 478-79.
213 Id. at 478.
214 Id. at 479.
21 Trimble, 826 N.W.2d at 478.
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inception to the present."216 Marylynn petitioned the probate court after Judith
refused to account for any transactions that had occurred while Mary was
alive.217 The probate court ordered Judith to provide an accounting and refused
to allow her to recover some of her attorney's fees.2 18 However, this decision
was reversed on appeal.219
The appellate court undertook to resolve an apparent conflict between
two provisions of the Iowa Trust Code. Section 633A.4213 provides that trust
beneficiaries are generally entitled to an accounting, while section 633A.3103
provides that the trustee of a revocable trust owes a duty solely to the settlor
while she was alive and competent.220 Relying on Hoelscher v. Sandage,221 the
court reiterated that the plaintiff would not have been able to obtain an
accounting while Mary was alive.222 Concluding that this rule should be applied
to post-mortem demands for an accounting, the court observed that imposing a
retroactive duty to account to multiple beneficiaries for the period during which
the trust was revocable would greatly increase the burden on the trustee and
223increase the cost of trust administration. Furthermore, it would frustrate the
settlor's reasonable expectation of privacy, an important reason for creating a
revocable trust in the first place.224
In addition, while acknowledging that extending the duty to account
would possibly expose and deter wrongdoing by the trustee, the court declared
that it would also cause problems where transactions benefitted the settlor at the
expense of remainder beneficiaries.225 For example, settlors who expected to
incur high costs for end-of-life care might prefer to invest low-yield, short-term
investments to preserve liquidity even though remainder beneficiaries would
drive greater benefit longer-term investments.226 For these reasons, the court held
that Judith was not required to provide a retroactive accounting to the other trust
beneficiaries for transactions that took place while the trust was revocable.227
The Missouri Court of Appeals reached a similar result in In re Stephen
M Gunther Revocable Living Trust.228 The settlor, Stephen Gunther, established
216 Id. at 479.
217 id.
211 Id. at 481.
219 Id. at 494.
220 Trimble, 826 N.W.2d at 483 (citing IOWA CODE ANN. § 633A.4213(1), (2) (2009)).
221 Hoelscher, 462 N.W.2d at 294.
222 Trimble, 826 N.W.2d at 484.
223 Id. at 486.
224 Id.
225 Id. at 488.
226 id
227 Trimble, 826 N.W.2d at 489.
228 In re Stephen M. Gunther Revocable Living Trust, 350 S.W.3d 44, 44 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011).
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a revocable trust in 1997 and named J. Barry Gunther as the trustee.229 Later, in
2006, the settlor amended the trust, appointing himself as trustee and naming his
then-living descendants as residuary beneficiaries.230 Stephen died in 2009,
survived by his wife and two minor children, Alton and Adam.231 One year later,
the beneficiaries filed a petition, inter alia, for an accounting from the trust's
inception until its amendment in 2006.232 In particular, the beneficiaries sought
information about a real estate purchase that the settlor made with trust funds
while he was acting as trustee.233 The trial court granted summary judgment for
234
the trustee, and the plaintiffs appealed.
The appellate court acknowledged that the settlor of a revocable trust is
the sole beneficiary of the trust while he is alive, and during this time the trustee
owed a duty solely to the settlor, and consequently, the trustee's duty to inform
235
and report is owed exclusively to the settlor. Since the trustee owed no duty to
the remainder beneficiaries while the settlor was alive, the court reasoned that he
had no duty to account to them for transactions that occurred prior to the settlor's
death.23 6
Also, in In the Matter of Malansky, the New York Appellate Division
upheld a ruling by the surrogate's court that dismissed a remainder beneficiary's
objection to an accounting.237 In 1994, Harry and Marion Malasky created a joint
revocable trust naming themselves as co-trustees.238 Harry died in 1995 and
239 -240
Louis Klein succeeded him as co-trustee.2 3
9 The co-trustees resigned in 1998.
Harry's three children from a prior marriage objected to three accountings: the
first covered the period from the inception of the trust to Harry's death; the
second covered the period from Harry's death until the resignation of the co-
trustees in 1998; and the third was concerned with the administration of Harry's
241
estate. Marion petitioned the surrogate court to dismiss the children's
242
objection to all three accountings.
On appeal, the court upheld the lower court's ruling with respect to the
229 id.
230 Id. at 44-45.
231 Id. at 45.
232 Id.
233 Gunther, 350 S.W.3d at 45.
234 id.
235 Id. at 46.
236 Id. at 47.
237 In re Malasky, 736 N.Y.S.2d 151, 152-53 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).




242 Malasky, 736 N.Y.S.2d at 152.
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first accounting.243 According to the court, the only persons who had an interest
in the trust's income or principal during this period were the settlors, Harry and
244Marion. Since the children had no financial interest in the trust prior to the
settlor's death, they lacked standing to demand an accounting for the settlor's
administration of the trust while he was alive.245
The case Boyd v. Boyd provides an interesting illustration of the
majority rule, along with a healthy dose of sibling rivalry.246 In Boyd, a
Louisiana appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part the finding of a
lower court that the trustee should be held in contempt for failing to provide an
accounting to the trust beneficiaries.247 In 2001, Vernon and Dorothy established
a joint revocable trust, known as the common trust, which was funded by certain
248community property. Their children, John and Linda, were named as
remainder beneficiaries and John was appointed as trustee.249 At Vernon's death
in 2001, the common trust was divided into two separate trusts, the first-to-die
trust and the survivor's trust.250 Vernon and Dorothy were income beneficiaries
under the common trust, and Dorothy became the income beneficiary of both
trusts after Vernon died.251 Although the first-to-die trust was irrevocable at
Vernon's death, the survivor's trust remained revocable as long as Dorothy was
alive.252 Thereafter, John, as trustee, expended income from both trusts to pay for
253Dorothy's living expenses until her death in 2007.
After Dorothy died, Linda filed suit against John to obtain an accounting
254for the expenditures from the trust made by him from 2001 until 2007. The
trial court ordered John to provide the requested accounting and held him in
contempt when he failed to comply with its order.255 On appeal, John argued that
Linda had no right to an accounting for trust expenditures made during
Dorothy's lifetime.256 However, the appellate court distinguished between the
first-to-die trust and the survivor's trust.257 The first-to-die trust became
irrevocable when Vernon died, and a duty arose at that time to account to Linda,
243 Id. at 153.
244 id.
245 id.
246 See Boyd v. Boyd, 57 So. 3d 1169, 1180-81 (La. Ct. App. 2011).
247 Id. at 1171.
248 Id at 1172.
249 id.
250 id.
251 Boyd, 57 So. 3d at 1172.
252 id.
253 id.
254 Id. at 1172-73.
255 Id. at 1173.
256 Boyd, 57 So. 3d at 1173.
257 Id. at. 1177.
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as one of the trusted beneficiaries.258 However, since the survivor's trust retained
its revocable character, John owed a duty to account solely to Dorothy until her
death in 2007.259 Therefore, the court upheld the contempt order and held that
John owed a duty to account to his sister for expenditures made on Dorothy's
behalf from the first-to-die trust.260 However, it concluded that John did not have
a duty to account to Linda for expenditures made from the survivor's trust prior
to her death.26 1
The California Court of Appeal took a different view on this issue in
Evangelho v. Presoto.262 That case involved a revocable trust created by Joan
Evangelho in 1990.263 Joan appointed two of her children, Darlene Presoto and
John Evangelho, as co-trustees.264 However, John did not become aware of the
existence of the trust until Joan's death.265 The trust provided that Joan's jewelry
would be distributed at her death to Darlene, and the rest of the trust corpus
would be distributed in equal shares to Joan's six children: Darlene, Richard,
John, Daryl, Frank, and Ernest.266 Joan also executed a durable power of attorney
267
and named Darlene as her attorney-in-fact. Later, in 1990, Joan removed
268
Darlene and John as co-trustees and named herself instead. Between 1990 and
her death in 1995, Joan made several amendments to the trust.269 During that
time, Darlene made a number of withdrawals of trust assets and transferred them
to a joint bank account.27 0
After Joan's death, Darlene's brothers sought o compel her, as trustee,
to provide an accounting to them as beneficiaries of Joan's trust.21 The trial
272
court granted their petition, which Darlene appealed. The appellate court
acknowledged that the settlor of a revocable trust was entitled to all of the rights
of a beneficiary while she was alive and competent.273 However, the court
declared that the rights of the remainder beneficiaries, which it characterized as
"contingent" while the settlor was alive, matured into "present and enforceable
25s Id.
259 Id.
260 Id. at 1180.
261 Boyd, 57 So. 3d at 1177.
262 Evangelho v. Presoto, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146, 151 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).




267 Evangelho, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 147.
268 Id. at 148.
269 Id. at 147-48.
270 Id. at 148.
271 Id. at 149.
272 Evangelho, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 149.
273 Id. at 150-51.
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274rights" upon her death. According to the court, once the trust became
irrevocable at the death of the settlor, the remainder beneficiaries became
"protected persons" under the probate code and, as such, were entitled to demand
an accounting.275 Affirming the lower court's order to compel an accounting, the
appellate court declared:
In the instant case, respondents presented evidence that
appellant [Darlene] moved trust funds into the joint checking
account and wrote checks on the trust after she ceased to be a
trustee. During the same time frame, trust assets fell from a
rough value of $450,000 to $132,000 and [Darlene] used the
joint checking account for what appear to be personal expenses.
Accordingly, respondents made the necessary showing for an
accounting of the trust and joint checking account over the
entire period of the trust.276
A survey of the existing case law indicates that most courts will not
require the trustee of a revocable trust to provide a formal accounting concerning
transactions made during the settlor's lifetime.277 California seems to be an
outlier on this issue.
VIII. Actions against the Trustee for Breach of Fiduciary Duties
while Settlor was Alive.
Since remainder beneficiaries have not had much luck suing third-party
trustees for breach of fiduciary duty while the settlor was alive, do their chances
of success improve once the settlor has died and their interests have now become
vested?278 There seems to be a split of authority on this issue. One approach,
which is reflected by Lewis v. Star Bank279 and Stanton v. Wells Fargo Bank,280
denies standing to the remainder beneficiaries under these circumstances.
Another approach holds third-party trustees liable to remainder beneficiaries for
disbursement or other administrative actions taken during the settlor's lifetime.
In Lewis, the settlor, Mrs. Cullen, executed a funded revocable trust and a pour-
over will in 1974.281 The trust provided that Mrs. Cullen would have an absolute
right to use all of the trust assets, and at her death, the trust would be divided into
274 Id. at 151.
275 Id.
276 Id.
277 See generally Trimble, 826 N.W. 2d at 474; Gunther, 350 S.W. 3d at 44; Malansky, 736 N.Y.S. 2d at
151; Boyd, 57 So. 3d at 1169.
278 It should be noted that remainder beneficiaries whose interests were contingent during the income
beneficiary's lifetime can sue the trustees of a testamentary trust after their interest vests for acts
committed during the lifetime of an income beneficiary. See Smith v. Bank of Clearwater, 479 So. 2d 755,
757 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
279 See generally Lewis v. Star Bank N.A., Butler Cty, 630 N.E.2d 418 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
280 See generally Stanton v. Wells Fargo Bank Montana, 152 P.3d 115 (Mont. 2007).
281 Lewis, 630 N.E.2d at 420.
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two halves: one half for Bonnie and the other half to be further divided into
thirds between Bonnie and her three children: Cameron, Jennifer, and James.282
The trust beneficiaries alleged that the Bank, acting as trustee,
committed malpractice by failing to inform the settlor and the beneficiaries about
the adverse effect the federal generation-skipping transfer tax would have on
their interest in the trust.283 The trial court dismissed the Bonnie and her
children's claim against the Bank and the law firm that provided legal advice to
284
the Bank. On appeal, the court declared that during her lifetime, the settlor
was the sole beneficiary of the trust and the plaintiffs had no entitlement to the
trust property.285 Moreover, during that time, neither Bonnie nor her children
were in privity with either the settlor, the Bank, or the law firm, and
consequently, they could not sue for any mistakes that might have been made in
connection with the drafting of the will or the trust.286
The Montana Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in Stanton v.
Wells Fargo Bank. In 1977, Frances Barker and her husband executed revocable
trust agreements naming a local trust company and Norwest Capital
287
Management as trustees. Wells Fargo later took over the job of administering
the trust.2 88 The purpose of the trusts was to manage the couple's finances and to
provide for their daughter Joanne.289 Joanne was married at the time to Wendell
Stanton, and Joanne's parents were concerned about Wendell's ability to manage
his finances and provide for Joanne. 290 The trust provided that if Joanne became
the beneficiary of the trust, she could appoint trust property to various charities
and blood relatives, but not to Wendell.291 Wendell and Joanne divorced in 1995,
but they remained on friendly terms notwithstanding the divorce.292 When
Joanne developed terminal cancer in 1996, Frances met with her attorney to
change the beneficiary of her trust.293 One of the beneficiaries of the amended
trust was a charitable organization named Trail's End.294
After Joanne's death in 1997, Wendell's relationship with Frances
improved considerably, and she amended her will and the trust in 2000 to make
282 id
283 Id. at 419.
284 Id.
285 Id. at 420-21.
286 Lewis, 630 N.E.2d at 421.










Wendell the sole beneficiary.295 This action terminated the status of Trail's End
as a trust beneficiary.296 She also transferred $532,500 worth of stock from the
trust to Wendell several months later.297 In 2002, her former attorney contacted
officers at Wells Fargo and informed them that he thought that Wendell was
exercising undue influence over Frances, who by that time was more than ninety
years old.298 Shortly thereafter, Frances broke her hip and moved into a nursing
299home where she died in 2003. When Wendell requested Wells Fargo to
transfer the trust's assets to him as a final distribution, the bank refused and
sought a judicial determination as to whether the latest will, amended trust, and
inter vivos gifts to Wendell were the product of undue influence.300 At that point,
Trail's End intervened as a beneficiary of the 1996 trust and alleged that Wells
Fargo breached its duty to Trail's End as a beneficiary by failing to prevent
Wendell from exercising undue influence over Frances. 30 Trail's End also
contended that Wendell had a fiduciary relationship with Frances as her attorney
and that he was guilty of undue influence and constructive fraud by inducing her
to make inter vivos gifts to him and naming him as the sole beneficiary of her
new will and trust.302
The lower court ruled that Trail's End failed to prove either undue
influence or constructive fraud on the part of Wendell and also determined that
Wells Fargo owed no fiduciary duty to Trail's End.303 Therefore, it ordered
Wells Fargo to distribute the remaining trust assets to Wendell.304 On appeal, the
Montana Supreme Court agreed with the lower court that Trail's End failed to
prove that Frances was suffering from diminished capacity or that Wendell
exercised undue influence over Frances in order to induce her to change her will
and trust.305
The court also determined that Wells Fargo did not owe any duty to
306Trail's End3. It based this finding on Montana's version of the Uniform Trust
Code, observing that section 72-33-701 declared that the trustee owed duties
only to the person holding the power to revoke while that person was
competent.307 The court noted that at the time Frances amended the trust, she had
295 Id. at 117-18.
296 Id. at 117.





302 Stanton, 152 P.3d at 118.
303 id.
304 Id. at 118-19.
305 Id. at 119-21.
3 Id. at 122.
307 Stanton, 152 P.3d at 122 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-33-701 (2007) (repealed by MONT. CODE
ANN. § 72-38-808 (2013))).
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the power to revoke and was competent to do so.308 Therefore, it concluded that
Wells Fargo owed a fiduciary duty only to Frances regarding the trust and not to
Trail's End.309
However, other courts have disagreed with this approach and have
concluded that a third-party trustee may be liable to the remainder beneficiaries
for disbursement or other administrative actions taken during the settlor's
lifetime.3 10 For example, in Siegel v. Novak, Dorothy Rautboard created a
revocable trust in 1990 and named JP Morgan Trust Company as trustee.
3 1 ' The
trust instrument provided that her three children, Daniel, Simon, and Judith
would receive the trust assets at her death.3 12 That same year, Dorothy executed a
durable power of attorney, naming Judith as attorney-in-fact and purporting to
give her the authority to make withdrawals from the trust.313 This power of
withdrawal was arguably inconsistent with the terms of the trust, which stated
that the revocation powers be personal to the settlor and cannot be exercised by
any other persons, including the settlor's power of attorney.314 Dorothy died in
2002 and was survived by her three children.315
Between 1995 and 2001, while Dorothy was still alive, Judith made a
number of large withdrawals from the trust, ostensibly for Dorothy's support, by
signing a series of revocation letters by virtue of her power of attorney.316 P
Morgan, in its capacity as trustee, approved each of these withdrawals.
317
However, in 2001, JP Morgan acknowledged that these withdrawals might not
have been valid because the trust instrument expressly stated that the power to
revoke was personal to the settlor and could not be exercised by the settlor's
attorney-in-fact. 318 In 2003, JP Morgan sought to have its accounting approved
and be discharged from any liability for its actions prior to Dorothy's death.
3 19
Daniel and Simon objected.320 However, the trial court ruled that Daniel and
Simon did not have standing to challenge any distributions made before
Dorothy's death and approved the JP Morgan's accounting.321
30s Stanton, 152 P.3d at 122.
3 Id.
310 See generally In re Estate of Giraldin, 290 P.3d 199 (Cal. 2012) (holding that the beneficiaries have
standing to sue the trustee for breach of fiduciary duty after the settlor has died); Siegel v. Novak, 290 So.
2d 89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the beneficiaries have standing to sue the trustee).
3' Siegel, 920 So. 2d at 91.
312 Id.
313 Id. at 92.
314 id.
31 Id. at 91.




320 Id. at 93.
321 Siegel, 920 So. 2d at 93.
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On appeal, the court declared it would apply the law of New York since
the situs of the trust was in that state.322 After reviewing several New York cases,
the court declared:
under New York law, after the death of the settlor, the
beneficiaries of a revocable trust have standing to challenge
pre-death withdrawals from the trust which are outside the
purposes authorized by the trust and which were not approved
or ratified by the settlor personally or through a method
contemplated through the trust instrument.323
The court reasoned that refusing to allow a trust beneficiary to challenge a third-
party trustee's actions would reward wrongdoing that might have been concealed
from the settlor during her lifetime.324
The California Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in the Estate
of Giraldin.325 In that case, the settlor, William Giraldin, created a revocable
trust and named his son Timothy as trustee.326 William was the sole beneficiary
of the trust while he was alive, and his wife Mary was entitled to the benefits of
327the trust after his death. After Mary's death, the couple's nine children would
divide the trust assets.328 Originally, the trust was unfunded.329 However,
between 2002 and 2003, William purchased about $4 million worth of stock in
SafeTzone Technologies, a company established by his son, Patrick, and
transferred the stock into the trust.330 Unfortunately, by the time William died in
2005, the stock had drastically declined in value.3 3 1
After William's death, four of his children brought suit against Timothy
in his capacity as trustee for breach of his fiduciary duties, alleging that he had
squandered the trust assets to benefit himself and Patrick, thereby depriving the
other children of their beneficial interest in the trust.332 The plaintiffs sought to
remove Timothy as trustee and to surcharge him in connection with the
SafeTzone investment and for making loans to himself and Patrick.3 33 At trial,
the court found that William was not sufficiently competent after 2001 to
effectively consent to Timothy's investment decisions.3 34 The lower court held in
322 Id. at 94.
3 Id. at 95.
324 Id. at 96.




329 Id. at 202.
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favor of the plaintiffs and Timothy appealed.3  The appellate court reversed,
finding that the Timothy owed no duty to the plaintiffs as long as William was
alive and, therefore, would not be liable to them for actions taken during that
time.336
Upon further appeal, the California Supreme Court reversed the decision
of the appellate court.37 The court acknowledged that Timothy owed no duty to
the remainder beneficiaries while William was alive.338 However, the court
declared that if Timothy breached a fiduciary duty to William while he was
alive, then it must decide whether the plaintiffs had standing to sue Timothy for
breach of his duty to William.339 After reviewing various provisions of the state
probate code, the court concluded that "the code, as a whole, implies that after
the settlor has died, the beneficiaries of a revocable trust may challenge the
trustee's breach of the fiduciary duty owed to the settlor to the extent that breach
harmed the beneficiaries' interests."340
The court also relied on the Restatement (Third) of Trusts for support.
341
Although the Restatement did not expressly address the question, the court
pointed out that one of the comments to section 74 declared that a trustee may be
liable to remainder beneficiaries after the settlor's death, at least in some
instances, thereby suggesting that they would have standing to assert their
claims.342 The court also cited the Uniform Trust Code section 603(a) and an
accompanying comment for the proposition that beneficiaries would have a right
to sue a trustee for breach of trust after the settlor died or became
incapacitated.34 3 Therefore, the court concluded that William's children had
standing to sue Timothy for breach of trust even though William's wife Mary,
the new income beneficiary, was still alive.344
IX. In Search of an Equitable Solution.
As the foregoing discussion suggests, courts have disagreed about
whether remainder beneficiaries should be able to challenge the actions or
mental capacity of the settlors of revocable trusts or the actions of third-party
trustees, particularly while the settlor is still alive. In deciding these cases, the
courts tend to adopt one of two approaches. The first perspective is doctrinal or
formalistic in nature and focuses on the parties' respective interests in the trust.
335 Giraldin, 290 P.3d at 202-03.
336 Id. at 203.
3' Id. at 204.
33 id.
339id
3o Giraldin, 290 P.3d at 204.
3' Id. at 208.
342 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 74 cmt. b).
3 Id. at 209 (citing UNF. TRUST CODE § 603 & cmt. (2000)).
`4 Id. at 211.
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The second perspective is normative in nature and emphasizes considerations
such as protecting the interests or expectations of the various parties or providing
a remedy against wrongdoing or breach of fiduciary duty.
A. A Doctrinal Perspective.
When a court engages in a doctrinal analysis in this area, it usually
concentrates on the interests of the settlor and remainder beneficiaries' interest
during the settlor's lifetime and tries to fit them within a traditional future
interest category. However, this approach assumes that each party has some
interest in the trust while the settlor is alive. In particular, if a remainder
beneficiary is entitled to some legal protection while the settlor is alive, the court
must be able to identify specifically what the beneficiary's interest is. Is it a
contingent remainder, a vested remainder subject to complete divestment, or is it
something even more esoteric?
At least one court has admitted that it could not fit the remainder
beneficiary's interest within any conventional category of future interest.345
However, others have been more adventuresome. For example, some courts have
categorized the remainder beneficiary's interest as a "contingent" interest.346
However, it appears that these courts are giving the term its popular meaning
rather than characterizing the remainder beneficiary's interest as a formal
contingent remainder. This would be inappropriate because, according to the
traditional law of future interests, contingent remainders are contingent only
when the beneficiaries are either unborn or unknown, or if their interest is
subject to a condition precedent. Obviously, the first two types of contingent
remainder are not involved in a typical revocable trust. The third type of
contingent remainder, the condition precedent, is also problematic. To describe
the remainder beneficiary's interest as a contingent remainder subject to the
condition precedent hat the settlor will die without revoking the trust is a stretch.
Moreover, if courts were to accept this characterization, they would have to
conclude that the trustee owes some sort of fiduciary duty to the remainder
beneficiary, a conclusion that is contrary to the current state of the law.
Other courts have described the remainder beneficiary's interest as a
vested remainder subject to complete divestment.347  However, this
characterization does not seem accurate either. If the remainder beneficiary's
interest is vested but subject to complete divestment, someone else would have
to possess the executory interest that could cut off the remainder beneficiary's
interest. Presumably, this would be the settlor. It seems strange to conceptualize
the power to revoke as an executory interest. But if the settlor does not have an
345 See Farkas v. Williams, 125 N.E.2d 600, 603 (111. 1955). Maybe the remainder beneficiary's interest
was a "farkas."
' See, e.g., Genova, 460 So. 2d at 897; Gilliland, 998 N.E.2d at 208; Hoelscher, 462 N.W.2d at 294;
Rudi, 148 P.3d at 748; Moon v. Lesikar, 230 S.W.3d 800, 803 (Tex. App. 2007).
" See Lewis, 630 N.E.2d at 421; Banks v. Means, 52 P.3d 1190, 1194 (Utah 2002).
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executory interest, who does? Furthermore, if the remainder beneficiary's
interest is characterized as vested (though subject to complete divestment) while
the trust is revocable, how could a court conclude that the trustee, whether it be
the settlor or a third-party trustee, owes no fiduciary duties to the remainder
beneficiary?
Another approach is to declare that the remainder beneficiary has no
interest at all in the trust while the settlor is alive348 or that he has a mere
expectancy.349 This characterization is consistent with the notion that a revocable
trust is nothing more than a will substitute, and therefore, remainder
beneficiaries are similar to devises or legatees under a will.350 To say that they
have a "mere expectancy" while the testator is alive is tantamount to saying that
they have no interest at all. This approach has the advantage of justifying a rule
that holds that the trustee owes no fiduciary duty to the remainder beneficiary
while the settlor is alive.
The Court of Appeal of Louisiana in Boyd v. Boyd apparently adopted
this view when it declared that the trustee had no duty to account to the
remainder beneficiary while the settlor was still alive because "the power of
revocation effectively renders the settlor the only party at interest in the trust."
351
A Missouri court relied on a state statute to support a similar conclusion when it
determined that that the settlor of a revocable trust "is treated as the sole
beneficiary."352
However, there is a problem with this approach as well. If the settlor is
both the sole trustee and the sole beneficiary of the trust during his lifetime, then
he would hold both sole legal and sole equitable title. In that case, either no trust
would arise in the first place, or title to the trust corpus would immediately revert
to the settlor by way of a resulting trust. If no trust existed at the settlor's death,
the trust property would remain in the settlor's estate and would not be
distributed to the remainder beneficiaries. Of course, this would defeat the entire
purpose of the revocable trust as a will substitute.
Even if any of these approaches were otherwise valid, they would not
shed much light on the question of whether a remainder beneficiary should be
able to challenge actions by the settlor or a third-party trustee that occurred once
the settlor has died. One solution to this problem was proposed by the California
Court of Appeal in Evangelho v. Presoto.353 According to the court, the
remainder beneficiary's rights in a revocable trust existed, but were "postponed"
and therefore remained dormant as long as the settlor was alive, but then would
348 See Malasky, 736 N.Y.S.2d at 152-53.
349 See Gribble, supra note 26, at 386.
350 Feder & Sitkoff, supra note 10, at 11.
3SI Boyd, 57 So. 2d at 1176.
352 Gunther, 350 S.W.3d at 46.
353 See Evangelho, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 146.
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spring forth like a butterfly at the settlor's death.354 At this time, the remainder
beneficiary's right would become sufficiently robust to enable him to review the
trustee's conduct prior to the settlor's death if it adversely affected his present
interest in the trust. 355 Frankly, the Evangelho court's relation back analysis
seems to rely more on ipse dixit than compelling logic. If the remainder
beneficiary could not assert any rights against a trustee while the settlor was
alive, why should he be able to sue the trustee for wrongful acts committed in the
past once the settlor is dead? Perhaps the remainder beneficiary has a sort of
"springing" executory interest except that it does not divest the settlor of
anything.
Finally, a number of courts have focused on the nature of the settlor's
rights in contrast to those of the remainder beneficiaries. Typically, they
conclude that the settlor is the sole owner of the trust property while he is
alive.356 However, this analysis is also unsatisfactory because if the settlor has
the sole beneficial interest in the trust and the remainder beneficiary has nothing,
then the trust would seem to be illusory.
While the foregoing analysis supports the current rules with respect to
the rights of remainder beneficiaries, it seems to lead to the conclusion that
revocable trusts are not really trusts at all, at least during the settlor's lifetime.
Rather, they are will substitutes that appropriate many of the trappings of formal
trusts but are actually sui generis. If this is the case, courts should abandon the
attempt to determine the rights of settlors and remainder beneficiaries by
reference to formalistic categories such as vested and contingent interests and
instead address this problem from the perspective of normative principles. In
other words, they should identify the actual interests of the various parties
involved and fashion a rule that balances these interests fairly.
B. A Normative Perspective.
1. Protecting the Interests of the Settlor.
We start with the assumption that revocable trusts are primarily intended
to protect the interests of the settlor, at least while the settlor is alive. First and
foremost, these trusts serve as will substitutes, enabling the settlor to transfer
property to the trust beneficiaries at death while avoiding the inconvenience and
expense of probate.357 Therefore, it is desirable for a revocable trust to have
some of the attributes of a formal will without encumbering it with the more
burdensome aspects of a testamentary instrument. A second benefit of revocable
trusts is flexibility. Like wills, they can be revoked or changed by a settlor at any
354 Id. at 151.
35 id.
356 Giraldin, 290 P.3d at 210.
35 See Feder & Sitkoff, supra note 10, at 2.
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time prior to death.358 A third advantage of revocable trusts is, like wills, they
remain private during the settlor's lifetime.359 Moreover, unlike wills, revocable
trusts do not necessarily become public documents at the settlor's death.360 Thus,
it is important to the settlor that the rules applicable to revocable trusts facilitate
flexibility, privacy and avoidance of probate.
What role should these interests play in determining whether remainder
beneficiaries should be able to inquire into or challenge the validity of actions
taken by the settlor or a third-party trustee? Allowing remainder beneficiaries to
intervene while the settlor is alive would unquestionably conflict with the
settlor's privacy interest and might also impede other estate planning goals.
However, since these interests seem to be less important once the settlor is dead,
one can argue that the interests of remainder beneficiaries may outweigh those of
the settlor at this point.
2. Protecting the Interests of the Remainder Beneficiaries.
Remainder beneficiaries will no doubt prefer a rule that gives them the
right to obtain more information.361 In addition, they will contend that their
interests should be protected against wrongdoing by the trustee during the
settlor's lifetime, particularly if he is vulnerable to theft or undue influence.
Remainder beneficiaries will also want to proceed against a trustee for a
breach of duty prior to the settlor's death. To be sure, remainder beneficiaries
ought to be protected against wrongdoing by the trustee that occurred during the
settlor's lifetime if this wrongdoing adversely affects their current interest in the
trust. However, allowing them to sue trustees for such wrongdoing would
vindicate their interests and would also discourage wrongdoing by trustees
during the settlor's lifetime.
X. Conclusion.
Courts have concluded that neither the settlor nor a third-party trustee
owes a fiduciary duty to remainder beneficiaries during the settlor's lifetime.362
Therefore, during the settlor's lifetime, remainder beneficiaries have no standing
to seek information about the trust or challenge the actions of settlor or a third-
party trustee.363 This rule is appropriate if a revocable trust is similar to a will,
where the universal rule is that beneficiaries are not allowed to challenge the
testator's sanity or his judgment while he is alive.
35 See Newman, supra note 3, at 553-54.
359 See Beauchamp, supra note 18, at 672.
3 See Foster, supra note 17, at 724-25.
361 See id. at 614-15.
362 See Synovus Tr. Co., N.A., 41 So. 3d at 74; Gunther, 350 S.W.3d at 47.
363 See Linthicurn, 148 P.3d at 747; Malasky, 736 N.Y.S. 2d at 153.
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However, after the settlor's death the situation changes. When the settlor
dies, the trust becomes irrevocable, and the trustee now owes a fiduciary duty to
the remainder beneficiaries. This supports a rule that allows at least some
remainder beneficiaries to obtain basic information about the trust's assets and
terms, though not necessarily the right to receive a detailed accounting of
transactions that occurred during the settlor's lifetime. Therefore, the following
rule would not excessively favor either the settlor or the remainder beneficiaries.
Rather, it would provide an appropriate balance between the interests of both
parties:
While the settlor of a revocable trust is alive, the trustee owes a
fiduciary duty solely to the settlor and not to any of the
remainder beneficiaries. If the settlor becomes physically or
mentally incapacitated, the trustee will owe fiduciary duties to a
court-appointed guardian or conservator who is responsible for
protecting the settlor's interests.
After the death of the settlor, the trustee will owe fiduciary
duties to qualified remainder beneficiaries. This will include a
duty to inform each remainder beneficiary about the existence,
assets and general terms of the trust insofar as they affect that
person's financial interests. The trustee may also be required to
provide qualified remainder beneficiaries with an accounting
with respect to transactions that have occurred after the settlor's
death. However, the trustee will not be required to provide
information with respect to transactions that occurred prior to
the settlor's death, unless ordered to do so by a court having
jurisdiction over the trust or over the case. The court may order
such accounting only if the remainder beneficiary submits
credible evidence of wrongdoing by the trustee or another or
credible that the trustee or another has exercised undue
influence over the settlor while he was alive.
Hopefully, this rule will enable remainder beneficiaries who have a bona
fide reason to suspect that the trustee committed wrongful acts during the
settlor's lifetime to obtain information to support their claim of wrongdoing. At
same time, requiring remainder beneficiaries to make a prima facie case before
the court as a precondition to forcing the trustee to account will prevent them
from engaging in a fishing expedition.
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